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U.K. POST-BREXIT TRADE AGREEMENTS AND DEVOLUTION 
Billy Melo Araujo – Queen’s University Belfast 
 
Abstract: 
 
This paper examines the role to be played by the devolved administrations in the 
negotiation, conclusion and implementation of trade agreements concluded by the UK post-
Brexit. By examining, from a comparative perspective, examples of collaborative frameworks 
between sub-national entities and central governments established in federal jurisdictions, it 
proposes a significant reform of existing inter-governmental cooperation mechanisms to 
ensure that devolved administrations are given a meaningful voice in the shaping of future 
trade agreements. 
 
Keywords: Brexit; Devolution; Trade; WTO; FTAs; EU; Comparative Federalism; Inter-
governmental relations 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
For the past 40 years, the United Kingdom (UK) has been precluded from carrying 
out its own international trade policy. Under the Common Commercial Policy, the EU had the 
exclusive competence to conduct trade policy and relations on behalf of its Member States. 
This included the right to regulate all aspects of external trade and to conclude trade 
agreements. Those powers will be repatriated once the UK formally leaves the EU, meaning 
that the UK will now be solely responsible for its external trade relations. This will enable the 
UK to negotiate and conclude its own trade agreements and to regulate market access 
issues (e.g., tariffs, subsidies, trade remedies) in the future, and it will also require the 
establishment of new legislative and institutional frameworks under which the UK’s trade 
policy will operate.  
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The ability to negotiate trade agreements has also been identified by the UK 
government as one of the key “red lines” in the negotiating objectives for exiting the EU1 and 
the UK has already established a Department of International Trade whose remit includes 
the negotiation of future UK trade agreements. Much has already been discussed and 
written about the existing legal parameters (at both EU and international level) within which 
the UK trade policy will be conducted, as well as the shape that the UK’s future trade policy 
may take2. Far less attention, however, has been devoted to the decision making processes 
which will underpin the UK’s trade policy and law and, in particular, the constituent actors 
that will be involved in shaping such policy and law. This question is particularly relevant with 
respect to the UK’s devolved administrations, which will all have a significant stake in the 
UK’s future trade policy. Not only will trade have a considerable impact on the economies of 
devolved administrations, but many of the issues that will be addressed in trade agreements 
will fall under the competence of devolved administration. This paper argues that a 
significant level of involvement of devolved administrations in the development and 
implementation of the UK’s trade policy is desirable, in order to ensure a coherent and 
inclusive trade policy which takes into account the interests and needs of all of the UK’s 
constituent parts.  
 
Currently, cooperation between Whitehall and devolved administrations in the UK is 
governed by the Devolution Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), a non-binding 
instrument that spells out principles and institutions that underpin arrangements for inter-
                                                            
1 Theresa May, ‘The government's negotiating objectives for exiting the EU’ 17 January 2017.  
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-governments-negotiating-objectives-for-exiting-the-eu-
pm-speech  
2 See, for example, E Lydgate, J Rollo and R Wilkinson, The UK Trade Landscape After 
Brexit’ UK Trade Policy Observatory, October 2016. R. Holmes, J Rollo and L A Winters ‘Negotiating 
the UK's Post-Brexit Trade Arrangements’ (2016) 238(1) National Institute Economic Review, R22-
R3; H Hestermeyer and F Ortino, ‘Towards a UK Trade Policy Post-Brexit: The Beginning of a 
Complex Journey’, King's College London Law School Research Paper No. 2017-04 
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governmental relations3. However, the cooperation mechanisms established by the MoU 
have, in practice, proved largely ineffective and much of UK inter-governmental cooperation 
occurs through bilateral and informal communication channels. Therefore, this paper seeks 
to explore the possibility of developing a cooperation structure and processes which would 
enable devolved administrations to have a tangible impact on shaping the negotiations of 
trade agreements. It does so by examining, from a comparative perspective, examples of 
collaborative frameworks between sub-national entities and central governments established 
in federal jurisdictions, namely Canada, Germany and the United States. Of course, the 
models of inter-governmental cooperation developed in these jurisdictions may not 
necessarily be transposable in the UK because of differences between federalism and 
devolution.  In particular, the clear constitutional demarcation of power between different 
levels of government in federalism offers sub-federal entities a higher degree of autonomy 
compared to devolution where sovereignty of parliament is maintained and powers are 
merely “delegated” 4  to territorial units and can, ultimately, be revoked by parliament. 5 
Nevertheless, the practical similarities between federalism and devolution mean that a 
comparative analysis is worthwhile6. This can identify best practice developed in federal 
systems that could be explored in the UK context, and which could enhance the impact of 
devolved administrations on the decision making process.  
 
Finally, it should be mentioned that this paper is premised on the assumption that the 
UK will be able to conduct an independent trade policy that would encompass the entirety of 
the country post-Brexit. Recent events have, however, cast doubt on this assumption. In 
particular, with respect to Northern Ireland, the need to avoid a hard border with the Republic 
                                                            
3  Memorandum of Understanding and Supplementary Agreements between the UK 
Government, the Scottish Ministers, the Welsh Ministers, and the Northern Ireland Executive 
Committee (October 2013). Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/devolution-
memorandum-of-understanding-and-supplementary-agreement. 
4  S D O’Connor, ‘Altered States: Federalism and Devolution at the Real Turn of the 
Millennium’ (2011) 60(3) Cambridge Law Journal 503. 
5 V Bogdanor, ‘Constitutional Reform in Britain: The Quiet Revolution’ (2005) 8(73) Annual 
Review of Political Sciences 84. 
6  P Leyland, ‘The multifaceted constitutional dynamics of UK devolution (2011) 9(1) 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 253-256 
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of Ireland7 has raised the possibility of the granting of special status for Northern Ireland 
where it would align itself with the EU customs union and certain rules of the single market8. 
It is not entirely clear, at this stage, what the notion of customs and regulatory alignment 
would entail in practice, but an arrangement which would require Northern Ireland to 
maintain the same tariffs as the EU and apply the rules of the EU single market on industrial 
and agricultural goods may limit the scope of the application of future UK FTAs in Northern 
Ireland. This would inevitably require the development of sui generis arrangements that 
would accommodate the unique position of Northern Ireland within the UK and the EU9. 
 
Section 2 of the article discusses why the repatriation of trade competences to the 
UK raises the question of the role to be played by devolved administrations in the 
development of the UK’s trade policy and, in particular, the negotiation of trade agreements. 
Section 3 examines examples of inter-governmental cooperation practices in the area of in 
trade policy adopted in certain in federal jurisdictions with the aim of distilling the strengths 
and limits of available models, with a particular focus on the United States (US), Germany 
and Canada,. It aims to assess different systems of inter-governmental cooperation that 
have enabled sub-national entities to have an impact on the negotiation of trade 
agreements. Section 4 examines current inter-governmental cooperation frameworks in the 
UK, arguing that these have proved ineffective in fostering cooperation between Whitehall 
and devolved administrations in the field of international relations and therefore do not 
                                                            
7  See K Hayward and D Phinnemore, “UK Withdrawal (‘Brexit’) and the Good Friday 
Agreement” Directorate General for Internal Policies, Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and 
Constitutional Affairs, 10 November 2017. 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/596826/IPOL_STU(2017)596826_EN.p
df>. 
8   European Commission Draft Withdrawal Agreement on the withdrawal of the UK of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, 
28 February 2018. < https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/draft-withdrawal-agreement-
withdrawal-united-kingdom-great-britain-and-northern-ireland-european-union-and-european-atomic-
energy-community_en>; J Watz, ‘Ireland close to a border deal’ The Times, 30 November 2017; 
James Blitz, ‘Will a deal on Ireland be done?’ Financial Times, 1 December 2017. 
9 M. Gasiokek, ‘Backstop v2: A solution to trade with the EU post-Brexit’, UKTPO 2 May 2018; 
B Melo Araujo and F Lupo-Pasini, ‘Irish border backstop: many unanswered questions and 
considerable economic challenges’ LSE Brexit Blogs 5 June 2018. Available at: 
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2018/06/05/irish-border-backstop-many-unanswered-questions-and-
considerable-economic-challenges/.  
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provide a template for future cooperation in the area of trade. This section also outlines 
various reform proposals that should be considered in order to establish a system of inter-
governmental cooperation that is fit for purpose in the context of post-Brexit trade 
agreements. 
 
2. THE RATIONALE FOR INTER-GOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION IN THE AREA 
OF TRADE POLICY 
 
(a) The overlap between trade policy and devolved matters – a constitutional 
perspective 
Contemporary trade agreements have become all encompassing. They no longer 
focus exclusively on classic trade issues such as trade in goods or the removal of ‘border 
measures’ such as tariffs10. Today, the scope of trade agreements has expanded to cover a 
wide array of economic issues – from goods and services to procurement, competition 
policy, environmental and labour standards and human rights – and is increasingly focused 
on the removal of trade barriers that result from regulatory diversity. The emphasis is thus 
placed on adoption of common regulatory principles and standards on issues which, 
historically, have been the exclusive remit of national sovereignty11.  
 
The strong regulatory dimension of contemporary trade agreements means that 
these agreements intrude upon various aspects of regulatory and domestic policy-making. 
The upshot is that these agreements have become extremely politicised, raising significant 
                                                            
10 Richard Baldwin, ‘21st Century Regionalism: Filling the gap between 21st century trade and 
20th century trade rules’, Staff Working Paper ERSD-2011-08. Available at: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1869845.  
11 W. Dymond and M. Hart, “Post-Modern Trade Policy, Reflections on the Challenges to 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations After Seattle”, 34(3) Journal of World Trade 21-38; Henrik Horn, 
Petros C. Mavroidis, André Sapir, ‘Beyond the WTO? An Anatomy of EU and US Preferential Trade 
Agreements’ 33(1) (2010) The World Economy 1565; R Baldwin, “WTO 2.0: Governance of 21st 
century trade” (2014) 9(2) Review of International Organizations 261. 
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questions concerning their democratic legitimacy12. This is nothing particularly new. A recent 
example of this politicisation can be seen in the difficulties faced by the EU in its attempts to 
negotiate the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (the TTIP), a trade agreement 
with the United States 13 . Throughout the negotiations, the EU was faced with strong 
resistance from politicians and civil society actors alike because of the perception that the 
agreement would lead to a lowering of EU regulatory standards on issues such as consumer 
protection and environmental standards14. Trade agreements are in this way increasingly 
characterised by a tension between the use of trade agreements to regulate transnational 
issues and the resulting loss of regulatory autonomy and democratic accountability15. This 
tension is heightened in the context of countries that have multi-level systems of governance 
such as federal systems16. In these systems, where power is diffuse, trade agreements can 
have a direct impact on issues that are regulated at sub-national level.  
 
In the case of the UK, a number of areas that fall under the competence of devolved 
administrations could be affected in some shape or form by international trade law. Devolved 
matters cover areas such as health, education, economic development, transport, 
                                                            
12 F. Laursen and C. Roederer-Rynning, “Introduction: the new EU FTAs as contentious 
market regulation”, Journal of European Integration” (2017) 39(7); B. Hoekman and C. Sabel, “Trade 
Agreements, Regulatory Sovereignty and Democratic Legitimacy” EUI Working Papers RSCAS 
2017/36. Available at: 
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/47225/RSCAS_2017_36.pdf?sequence=1.  
13 For the EU’s textual proposals released during the negotiation of the TTIP see: 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/index_en.htm  
14 Ferdi De Ville and Gabriel Siles-Brugge, The Truth Behind the Transatlancti Trade and 
Investment Partnership (Polity, 2016); Gabriel Siles-Brugge, “Transatlantic investor protection as a 
threat to democracy: the potency and limits of an emotive frame”, (2017) 30 Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs:5 
15 E Bienvenisti, ‘Democracy Captured: The Mega-Regional Agreements and the Future of 
Global Public Law’ (2016) Constellations 58. 
16 P Goff, ‘Canadian Trade Negotiation in an Era of Deep Integration’, CIGI papers NO. 88, 
February 2016 (available at: 
https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/cigi_paper_no.88_web_0.pdf); P Mumford, ‘Regulatory 
Coherence – Blending Trade and regulatory Policy’, (2015) 10(4) Policy Quarterly 11; O Omiunu, ‘The 
Evolving Role of Sub-National Actors in International Economic Law: Lessons from the Canada-
European Union CETA’ in F Amtembrink, D Prevost and R Wessels (eds.) Netherlands Yearbook of 
International Economic Law (2017) 198. 
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environment, agriculture, fisheries and forestry17 - all topics that are routinely addressed in 
trade agreements. For example, not only are the agricultural and fisheries sectors subject to 
WTO rules relating to tariffs, subsidies and quantitative restrictions, they are also 
increasingly subject to disciplines imposed in bilateral and regional trade agreements18. 
Under the scope of economic development policy, the ability of devolved administrations to 
regulate public procurement or to provide state aid would also be constrained by 
international trade law19. Likewise, it has been shown that trade agreements dealing with 
trade in services can have an impact on the ability of countries to provide public services20. 
Inter-governmental cooperation in this area is crucial both in terms of the development of 
trade policy, by ensuring that the UK’s trade policy reflects the positions of the various 
regions of the country, and also in terms of the implementation of international trade law 
obligations which will occur at the devolved level. 
 
There is, it must be noted, some degree of uncertainty surrounding the scope of the 
devolved powers once the UK leaves the EU. Much of this uncertainty has been caused by 
the recently adopted EU Withdrawal Bill21, whose main purpose is to ensure legislative 
continuity post-Brexit by converting EU Law into UK domestic law (referred to as “retained 
EU law”). Clause 12 of the Withdrawal Bill precludes devolved institutions from amending 
retained EU law to the extent that such amendments are prohibited under regulations 
                                                            
17 See, for example the list of powers devolved to Scotland published by the Scottish 
Parliament: 
http://www.parliament.scot/images/Parliament%20Publications/ListDevolvedPowers_1999-2016.pdf.  
18 G Arevalo, ‘Free Trade Agreements and the Lacey Act: A Carrot and Stick Approach to 
Prevent and Deter Trade in IUU Fisheries’ (2015), 10 Fla. A & M U. L. Rev. 349; A Rologas Tsangalis, 
‘Fisheries Subsidies under the Trans-Pacific Partnership: Towards Positive Outcomes for Global 
Fisheries Sustainability and Regime Interaction under International Law’, (2017) 16(2) Melbourne 
Journal of International Law 2-31. 
19A Biondi, ‘The First on the Flight Home: The Sad Story of State Aid Control in the Brexit Age’ King’s 
Law Journal (2016) 442-451; P Telles and A Sanchez-Graells, ‘Examining Brexit Through the GPA's 
Lens: What Next for UK Public Procurement Reform?’ (2017) 47(1) Public Contract Law Journal 1-33. 
20 M. Krajeski, National regulation and trade liberalization in services: the legal impact of the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) on national regulatory autonomy (Kluwer Law 
International, 2013);  R  Adlung, ‘Public Services and the GATS’ Journal of International Economic 
Law (2016) 9(2) 455–485 
21  European Union Withdrawal Bill 2017-19. <https://services.parliament.uk/bills/2017-
19/europeanunionwithdrawal.html>. 
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adopted by UK ministers. The rationale behind clause 12 is that in the absence of common 
frameworks of law provided by EU law to ensure common approaches across the UK, such 
frameworks must now be provided centrally by the UK22. Should the bill be used to limit 
regulatory diversity within the UK, it would minimise the need for the involvement of devolved 
administrations in the negotiation of trade agreements touching on regulatory issues.23  
 
Another area of certainty concerns the question of Northern Ireland’s status within 
the UK. As the withdrawal negotiations have progressed, it has become increasingly evident 
that the UK’s future trade policy may be constrained by the need to comply with the 1998 
Good Friday Agreement 24 . The Good Friday Agreement provides the constitutional 
framework for peace and political stability in Northern Ireland and a central element of the 
peace process has been the removal of a land border within the Ireland which is 
underpinned by the Common Travel Area and EU law25. However, the decision to leave the 
EU raises the prospect of a hard border within the island of Ireland. Outside the customs 
union and the internal market, customs checks would be required to, for example, ensure the 
collection of tariffs, internal taxes and the verification of regulatory compliance. 
Both the UK and the EU have stressed the importance of avoiding such outcome26 
and, in February 2018, the EU published a Draft Withdrawal Agreement27 which included a 
                                                            
22  Intergovernmental Agreement on the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill and the 
Establishment of Common Frameworks, 24 April 2018. Available at: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/70
2623/2018-04-24_UKG-DA_IGA_and_Memorandum.pdf.  
23 For an analysis of the EU Withdrawal Bill and its impact on devolved competences see:  S 
Tierney, ‘The European Union (Withdrawal) Bill: legal implications for devolution’ UCL The 
Constitution Unit, 2 September 2017 [https://constitution-unit.com/2017/09/07/the-european-union-
withdrawal-bill-legal-implications-for-devolution/];  S Douglas-Scott, ‘Short Cust,(2017) 39(16)  London 
Review of Books, 16-17; N McEwen, ‘Trust in a time of Brexit’ The UK in a Changing Europe, 28 
November 2017 [http://ukandeu.ac.uk/trust-in-a-time-of-brexit]. 
24 The Good Friday Agreement (or Belfast Agreement) signed on 10 April 1998. Text available 
at:  
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/136652/agreement.pdf  
25 Anthony Gordon, ‘Brexit and the Irish Border: Legal and Political Questions’ Royal Irish 
Academy – 
British Academy Brexit Policy Discussion Paper October 2017.  
https://www.britac.ac.uk/sites/default/files/BrexitandtheIrishBorderLegalandPoliticalQuestions_0.pdf 
26 HM Government, ‘Northern Ireland and Ireland’ Position Paper 16 August 2017; European 
Commission, ‘Guiding principles transmitted to EU27 for the Dialogue on Ireland/Northern Ireland’ 6 
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Protocol on Northern Ireland (Protocol) proposing a “backstop” solution whereby Northern 
Ireland would become a Common regulatory Area (CRA) that would, unlike the rest of the 
UK, continue to comply with EU customs rules, the free movement of goods and relevant EU 
internal market legislation relating to goods. The backstop would constitute a measure of last 
resort in that it would only apply to the extent that no other solution is found to avoid the 
application of border checks on trade in goods within the island of Ireland.  The CRA, 
however, raises a number of difficult questions with respect to Northern Irelands’ status 
within the UK and the EU.  From a trade perspective, the requirement under the EU’s 
proposals that Northern Ireland’s customs and regulatory framework be in line with the EU 
rather than the UK would mean a considerable increase in devolved powers for this region 
and that, at least in the area of goods, Northern Ireland would be excluded from the UK’s 
post-Brexit trade agreements.  
 
(b) Potential impact of trade agreements on devolved territories 
Besides constitutional and political considerations, the broader economic impact of 
trade agreements on devolved territories must not be ignored. Whilst the empirical evidence 
suggests that trade liberalisation, on the whole, produces positive economic effects28, it is 
also fairly well established that not everyone wins from trade liberalisation29. There is clear 
evidence that opening domestic markets to foreign competition can adversely affect some 
domestic industries and, in doing so, harm those workers and regions that rely on these 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
September 2017 [European Commission, ‘Joint report from the negotiators of the European Union 
and the UK Government on progress during phase 1 of negotiations under Article 50 TEU on the UK's 
orderly withdrawal from the European Union’ 8 December 2017 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/joint_report.pdf. 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/guiding-principles-dialogue-ei-ni_en.pdf];  
27 Supra footnote 8. 
28  R Baldwin ‘Measurable dynamic gains from trade’ (1992) 100(1) Journal of Political 
Economy 162-174; M Kose and R Riezman, ‘Understanding the Welfare Implications of Preferential 
Trade Agreements’ in R Riezman (ed) International Trade Agreements and Political Economy (World 
Scientific, 2012) 85-99. 
29 D Rodrik, Straight Talk on Trade: Ideas for A Sane Wold Economy (Princeton University 
Press, 2018). 
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industries30. The negotiation of trade agreements thus typically involves a delicate trade-off 
between two conflicting goals: the desire to open foreign markets in those sectors where a 
country has offensive interests and the need to protect domestic industries where it holds 
defensive interests31.   
This is also relevant in relation to devolution. Inter-governmental cooperation is 
crucial in so far as the various devolved administrations of the UK do not necessarily hold 
the same offensive and defensive economic interests. Northern Ireland offers a striking 
illustration of the different and sometimes conflicting interests in trade between regions in the 
UK32. Whilst trade in services account for the majority of the UK’s trade, services only 
represent a small proportion of Northern Ireland exports. Striking disparities also emerge 
even in trade in goods. For example, whilst Northern Ireland is heavily reliant on exports in 
the foods, beverages and agricultural sectors, the rest of the UK has a greater reliance on 
manufacturing goods and the chemical sector33. Equally, Northern Ireland is far more reliant 
on access to the EU internal market than the rest of the UK34.  
Another example can be found in the case of Scotland whose most important goods 
exports are mineral fuels35. Conversely, mineral fuels do not fall in the top 5 commodities for 
exports for either England or Northern Ireland and only account for a small proportion of 
                                                            
30 G Harrison, T Rutherford and D Tarr, ‘Trade liberalization, poverty and efficient equity’ 
(2003) Journal of Development Economics (2003) 71(1) 97-128; M Kolsky Lewis, ‘WTO Winners and 
Losers: The Trade and Development Disconnect’(2007) 39(1) Georgetown Journal of International 
Law 165-198; G Genna, ‘Economic size and the changing international political economy of trade: 
The development of western hemispheric FTAs’ (2010) 47 International Politics, 640; P Dixon, 
‘Australia's Recent FTAs: Insights from Theory and Modelling on Rationale, Welfare Gains and 
Political Heat’ (2015) 34 Econ Pap 208-217. 
31 E Mansfield, Votes, Vetoes, and the Political Economy of International Trade Agreements 
(Princeton University Press, 2012); E Lydgate and R Amos, ‘Integrating Sustainable Development 
Objectives into UK Trade Policy’ UKTPO Briefing Paper 19, May 2018, 4. Available at: 
http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/76209/1/Briefing-paper-19-ESD-Web.pdf.  
32 J Tongue, “The Impact of Withdrawal from the European Union upon Northern Ireland”, The 
Political Quarterly 87(3) (2016), 341. 
33 P Mac Flyn, “The Economic Implications of BREXIT for Northern Ireland”, NERI Working 
Paper Series, April 2016, NERI WP 2016/No 35.  
Available at: http://www.nerinstitute.net/download/pdf/brexit_wp_250416.pdf.  
34 Ibid. 
35 HM Revenue and Customs, ‘Regional Trade in Goods Statistics, 7 June 2018, 19. Available 
at: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/68
6571/RTS_Q4_2017.pdf.  
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Welsh exports36. The differing economic profiles of territories within the UK means that it is 
not beyond the realm of possibility that the negotiation of a trade agreement that creates 
broad economic benefits for the UK as a whole may lead to losses in certain devolved 
regions.  
The overlap and potential areas of interaction between trade agreements and 
devolved matters mean that devolved administrations may be called upon to play an 
important role in the negotiation, conclusion and implementation of trade agreements. This is 
desirable for two key reasons. Firstly, devolved administrations can contribute towards a 
more efficient trade policy. Their expertise on devolved matters and their greater grasp of the 
potential impact of international trade commitments on local issues can inform Whitehall’s 
approach and lead to the formulation of more rounded trade negotiating objectives. 
Secondly, by ensuring that devolved administrations’ interests and concerns are heard and 
taken into account in trade negotiations, the UK would enhance the legitimacy of the 
outcome of such negotiations. From a constitutional perspective, a scenario where trade 
agreements negotiated exclusively by central government could impose regulatory policies 
in areas that fall within devolved competence would raise questions regarding the 
democratic legitimacy of these agreements37.  
This is not an insignificant concern. Trade agreements have been used by 
governments to circumvent domestic opposition and push through controversial regulatory 
reforms (so-called “policy laundering”38). In the UK, whilst an Act of Parliament would have 
the power to indefinitely delay ratification in accordance with the 2010 Constitutional Reform 
and Governance Act, the ratification process itself is a crude instrument which offers limited 
leeway for parliamentary scrutiny39. Faced with a finalised trade agreement, Parliament will 
                                                            
36 Ibid, 10-17. 
37 R Rawlings, ‘Brexit and the Territorial Constitution’ The Constitution Society, November 
2017, 20. Available at: https://consoc.org.uk/publications/brexit-territorial-constitution-devolution-
reregulation-inter-governmental-relations/.  
38 P Yu, ‘The Political Economy of Data Protection’ (2010) 84 Chi.Kent L. Rev. 786-788.  
39 House of Commons Library, ‘Parliament’s Role in ratifying Treaties’, Briefing Paper No. 
5855, 17 February 2017. < file:///C:/Users/3049175/Downloads/SN05855%20(4).pdf>.; E Lydgate and 
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not have the flexibility to approve the agreement whilst rejecting problematic provisions. 
Rather, ratification comes down to a binary choice: the agreement must be approved or 
rejected in its totality. Parliament may therefore be placed in an uncomfortable position 
where it has to ratify an agreement despite concerns relating to specific issues in order not 
to scupper a trade agreement which, in most cases, is the result of a long process of 
negotiations.40 It is therefore possible that the UK government would use trade agreements 
to bypass potentially irksome domestic legislative processes, including on issues that relate 
to devolved matters.  
From a practical perspective, failure to include devolved administrations in the 
process of treaty making can create a dynamic of conflict and opposition between layers of 
government and non-implementation of trade obligations by sub-national governments. On 
the other hand, a consultative and participatory approach to the process can foster a sense 
of ownership, increasing the chances that trade obligations will be accepted and 
implemented at devolved government level. And, more importantly, by understanding 
devolved interests and the potential impact of trade rules on devolved economies, the UK 
will be better placed to further mitigate the negative economic consequences of trade 
agreements.  
(c) Current status of the debate 
 The above concerns have been echoed by devolved administrations. The Welsh 
government specifically called for the establishment of shared governance frameworks in 
areas where they have “a direct interest in trade negotiations, particularly given that these 
would have important inter-dependencies with key aspects of the policy and regulatory 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
R Amos, ‘Integrating sustainable development objectives into UK trade policy’ UKTPO Briefing Paper 
19, May 18 http://blogs.sussex.ac.uk/uktpo/publications/integrating-sustainable-development-
objectives-into-uk-trade-policy/ accessed 22 May 2018. 
40 M Cremona ‘International Regulatory Policy and Democratic Accountability’ in Marise 
Cremona et all (eds) Reflections on the Constitutionalisation of International Economic Law  (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2014) 166 
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context for devolved areas such as steel, agriculture or fisheries”.41 Scotland’s White Paper 
– Scotland’s Place in Europe – goes further by asserting that the Scottish government must 
“take part in trade negotiations that impact on devolved competences”42. A recent paper 
published by the Scottish government has also called for the development of a decision 
making process that would enable Scotland to play a role in “the preparation, negotiation, 
agreement, ratification and implementation of future trade deals” 43 . Whitehall partially 
acknowledged some of these concerns in the paper, “Preparing for our future UK trade” 
published by the UK Department of International Trade: 
The devolved administrations will have a direct interest in our future trade 
agreements. We will work closely with them to deliver an approach that 
works for the whole of the UK, reflecting the needs and individual 
circumstances of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, and 
drawing on their essential knowledge and expertise. We recognise that if 
we are to represent the UK effectively on the international stage, we must 
build support for our vision across all 4 nations and deliver real, tangible 
benefits. The Department for International Trade has worked successfully 
alongside the Scottish Government, Welsh Government, and Northern 
Ireland Executive and their agencies in promoting trade and investment 
activity and we intend to continue this collaborative approach as we 
develop the UK’s future trade policy.44 
                                                            
41  Brexit and Devolution – Securing Wales Future, January 2017, 15. Available at: 
https://beta.gov.wales/sites/default/files/2017-06/170615-
brexit%20and%20devolution%20%28en%29.pdf  
42  Scotland’s Place in Europe (2016), para 187. Available at:  
http://www.gov.scot/Resource/0051/00512073.pdf.  
43 ‘Scotland’s Role in theDevelopment of Future UK Trade Arrangements - A Discussion 
Paper’, Scottish Government, August 2018. Available at: 
https://www.gov.scot/Resource/0053/00539758.pdf.  
44 Department for International Trade, “Preparing for our future UK trade policy” October 
2017. Available:   
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/654714/Preparing_for_
our_future_UK_trade_policy_Report_Web_Accessible.pdf  
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The UK has thus recognised the need to craft a trade policy that reflects the 
interests of devolved administrations and is committed “to seek the input of the 
devolved administrations to ensure they influence the UK’s future trade policy”. 
However, no clear indication is given as to whether specific processes and frameworks 
will be put in place to enable such cooperation with respect to trade agreements. 
Events since have also not provided much comfort that there is a great deal of appetite 
from Whitehall to explore and implement effective cooperative frameworks.  
Firstly, the recently established Joint Ministerial Council on European 
Negotiations 45  – an inter-governmental forum intended to ensure devolved 
administrations are engaged in the process of negotiating the UK’s departure from the 
EU – has been severely criticised. Devolved administrations have dismissed it as a box 
ticking from Whitehall which is used primarily to disseminate minimal information whilst 
not truly engaging the governments in a consultation or negotiation process. 46 
Secondly, there have been reports suggesting that the current government would 
favour a decision making process in connection with future trade agreements that 
would completely exclude the involvement of devolved administrations47. Thirdly, the 
proposed UK Trade Bill 48 , which sets a framework for the renegotiation of trade 
agreements that the UK is currently party to as an EU Member State – does not 
foresee a significant role for devolved administrations. After the bill was first published 
a number of amendments were tabled proposing a role for devolved administrations in 
the decision making process relating to FTAs. Such amendments ranged from 
proposals to ensure the consent of devolved ministers for any regulations implementing 
                                                            
45 HM Government, The UK's Exit from and New Partnership with the European Union, Cm 
9417, 2017, 17. 
46 A Greer, ‘Brexit and Devolution’ (2017) The Political Quarterly, 2. 
47 S Coates, ‘Liam Fox tries to bypass Scots and Welsh in bid for Brexit trade deals’ The 
Times. 19 April 2017; ‘Brexit: Trade deals need UK-wide consensus, Carwyn Jones says’ BBC 19 
August 2017, Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-politics-40985845.  
48 Trade Bill 2017-19, 122—EN. 
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FTAs within the competence of devolved administrations49 to proposals to frameworks 
that would enable the consultation of devolved administrations on FTAs50. None of 
these amendments made their way into the current version of the Trade Bill which 
gives devolved administrations only limited implementation powers. In accordance with 
the bill, provisions of these agreements will be carried out by devolved administrations 
if a provision is within developed competence 51 . However, there are significant 
restrictions on the implementation power of devolved administrations, notably the fact 
that devolved administrations are precluded from acting in areas of retained direct EU 
legislation and that the consent of a Minister of the Crown is required prior to the 
adoption of regulations making provision about quota arrangements, on account of the 
need for a coordinated UK-wide position on such arrangements52.  
 All in all, then, while the question of whether devolved administrations will be 
involved in shaping future UK FTAs remains an open one, the general direction of 
travel already strongly suggests that they are likely to be side-lined from the decision 
making processes underpinning the negotiation of trade agreements 
 
3. SUB-NATIONAL ENTITIES AND TRADE AGREEMENTS 
 (a)  Trade policy in federal systems 
Conducting an international trade policy in a federal system can present a specific 
set of challenges. Whilst trade negotiations tend to fall under the exclusive competence of 
central governments, in many cases, competences of constituent units of a federation will 
overlap with areas that are regulated in trade agreements. Sub-national entities may 
therefore have a vested interest in ensuring that their interests and regulatory preferences 
                                                            
49 House of Commons, Public Bill Committee: 23 January 2018 , 34;  
50 House of Commons, Notice of Amendments given up to and including Tuesday 30 January 
2018, NC11. 
51 Trade Bill, Schedule 1, paragraph 1(1). 
52 Trade Bill, Schedule 1 paragraph 3(2) and (3) 
16 
 
are reflected in trade negotiations. Further, the responsibility for implementing international 
trade law obligations may fall on the sub-national entities, rather than the central 
government. The consultation of sub-national entities during the negotiation process 
increases the likelihood that sub-national measures that are inconsistent with treaty 
obligations are identified from the outset, thus reducing the likelihood that the 
implementation of the trade agreement will be opposed. A number of federal systems have 
therefore developed mechanisms that aim to address these challenges and reduce the 
potential for conflict between various levels of government with respect to international trade 
policy53.  
The nature and level of involvement of sub-national entities in trade policy decision-
making processes will vary depending on the model of federalism54. In some systems, sub-
national entities have significant powers in relation to foreign affairs. In Belgium, for example, 
subnational entities have the power to negotiate, conclude international agreements and 
implement international trade obligations that fall within the scope of their internal 
competences 55 . In others, the role of subnational entities is severely limited. In the 
Commonwealth of Australia, not only does the Commonwealth have treaty making power, it 
can also implement treaty obligations that relate to the legislative competence of the 
states56. The next section will carry out an analysis of three federal systems (U.S., Germany, 
Canada) where treaty making powers are centralised and where sub-national entities have 
varying degrees of powers with respect to treaty implementation. The different experiences 
and varying levels of success encountered by these systems in developing mechanisms that 
                                                            
53  P Fafard and P Leblond, ‘Twenty-First Century Trade Agreements: Challenges for 
Canadian federalism’ The Federal Idea, September 2012, 13. Available at: 
https://ideefederale.ca/documents/challenges.pdf; M Gehring, ‘Subnational Participation in 
International Trade Law Options for the European Union’ CIGI Papers No.167 – April 2018. Available 
at: https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/documents/Paper%20no.167_web.pdf.  
54 A Trench, ‘Intergovernmental Relations: In Search of a Theory’, in Scott Greer (eds) 
Territory, Democracy and Justice (Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) 224. 
55 Article 167 Belgian Constitution. See S Paquin, ‘Federalism and Compliance with 
International Agreements: Belgium and Canada Compared’ (2010) 5 The Hague Journal of Diplomacy 
185. 
56 Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1; See M Chiam ‘Tasmanian Dams and 
Australia's Relationship with International Law’ (2015) 24(1) Griffith Law Review 89-105, 
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allow for the involvement of sub-national entities in foreign affairs can provide some clarity 
and inform future attempts to increase the role of devolved administrations in the negotiation 
of UK FTAs.   
(b) United States 
The United States is a federal system where sovereignty is divided between the 
federal level and the states - the federal constituent units. Initially, the U.S was viewed as an 
example of dual federalism where the sphere of competences of federal government and 
state governments are wholly separate and distinct from each other57. American federalism 
has since evolved into a system of “concurrent regulatory jurisdiction” 58  thanks to US 
Supreme Court jurisprudence which has recognised the overlap between federal and state 
competences and increasingly curbed state competences at the expense of federal 
competences59.   
This peripheralisation of states is also reflected in the relatively limited role the U.S. 
Constitution foresees for states in foreign affairs60. In the field foreign affairs, the allocation of 
powers within the U.S Constitution points towards federal supremacy at the expense of U.S. 
states61. The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power to “regulate commerce with 
foreign nations” 62  and the President the power to make treaties 63 . By contrast, the 
Constitution generally excludes U.S. states from foreign affairs and, in particular, 
international trade matters.  They are precluded from applying “any imposts or duties on 
                                                            
57 E Cowin ‘The Passing of dual federalism’ (1950) 36(1) VA L Rev. 1-25; J Kincaid, ‘From 
Cooperative to Coercive Federalism’ (1990) 509(1) The Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science, 139-152; J F Zimmerman, ‘Preemption in the U.S. Federal System’ (1993( 23)  
Publius: The Journal of Federalism 1; E A Young, ‘Dual Federalism, Concurrent Jurisdiction and the 
Foreign Affairs Exception’ (2001) 97 Mich. L. Rev. 139. 
58 E A Young, ‘Dual Federalism, Concurrent Jurisdiction and the Foreign Affairs Exception’ (2001) 97 
Mich. L. Rev. 139; N Williams ‘The Commerce Clause and the Myth of Dual Federalism’ (2006) 54 
UCLA L. Rev. 1816-1930. 
59 Ibid 
60 R Baasch and S B Bangalore, ‘Congress and the Reconstruction of Foreign Affairs 
Federalism’ Michigan Law Review (2016) 115(1)  47. 
61 M Schaeffer, ‘Federal States in the Broader World’ (2011) 27 Canada-United States Law 
Journal 2. 
62 U.S. Const. Art. II, § 3. 
63 Id. Article II § 2. 
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imports or exports”64 and from entering “into any agreement or compact with another state, 
or with a foreign power”65.  
Whilst the power to negotiate and conclude international treaties rests firmly in the 
hands of Congress, states can play an role in implementing trade agreements. Under the 
U.S. constitutional system, treaties can either be self-executing or non-self-executing66. 
Treaties that are self-executing have direct effect meaning that they do not require 
implementing legislation and can be invoked by private persons directly before domestic 
courts67. Non-executing treaties, however, do require implementing legislation. This opens 
up the possibility for states to refuse to implement and comply with internarial treaties that 
implicate their spheres of competence68. It is problematic in the area of international trade 
law, since the U.S Congress has an established practice of precluding the self-executing 
effect of trade agreements69.  In theory, the federal government could override state law in 
order to ensure compliance with international law. Under the doctrine of pre-emption, the 
federal level can pre-empt state law via federal statutes or regulations or, even in the 
absence of any specific federal intervention, where state action impacts on federal foreign 
affairs70. Applied in the context of international trade policy, this means that state activities 
                                                            
64 Id. Art. I §10. 
65 Id. Art. I §10. 
66 M Matsushita, T Schoenbaum, P Mavroidi and M Hahn, The World Trade Organization – 
Law, Practice and Policy (OUP, 2017) 44. 
67 D Hollins and C M  Vasquez, ‘Treaty Self-Execution as “Foreign” Foreign Relations Law?’ 
in C Bradley (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Foreign Relations Law (OUP, 2018). 
Forthcoming. Available at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/2077/.  
68 A  Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (CUP, 2017,) 177. 
69 F M Abbott, ‘Intellectual Property Provisions of Bilateral and regional Trade Agreements in 
light of U.S. Federal Law’ UNCTAD ICTSD Project on IPRS and Sustainable Development, 2011, 
Issue Paper No.2 
70 J L Friesen, ‘The Distribution of Treaty-Implementing Powers in Constitutional Federations: 
Thoughts on the American and Canadian Models’ (1994) 94(4) Columbia Law Review 1429; C A 
Bradley ‘Federalism, Treaty Implementation, and Political Process: Bond v. United States’ (2014) 
108(3) American Journal of International Law 408; T Verellen, ‘Federalism and Foreign Affairs in 
Canada and the European Union: the Search for Equal Autonomy’ (2016) Cambridge J. Int’l & Comp. 
L 307. 
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relating to international trade can be pre-empted where they affect, directly or indirectly, U.S. 
trade policy71 
However, there is no known case of the federal government stepping in to pre-empt 
state law that would contravene an international trade agreement72 . For example, with 
respect to WTO law, the Uruguay Round Agreements Act73 (Act of Congress implementing 
WTO agreements in US law) does not grant the federal government the power to pre-empt 
state laws that violate WTO law. All the federal government can do is sue states for non-
compliance with WTO law74, a power which, according to a recent study by Timothy Meyer 
and Ganesh Sitaraman, has never actually been used75. According to Meyer and Sitaraman, 
this power reflects the US congressional resistance to federal intervention in areas that 
affect to state competence76. But the upshot is that in the U.S. States can, and have, 
maintained measures that are inconsistent with international trade law obligations77 and the 
federal government has been held responsible for the failure of states to comply with such 
obligations78. 
In an attempt to address these issues, the US has created communication channels 
through which federal trade officials and state representatives can establish dialogue on 
trade matters. One such channel is the State Single point of Contact System, whereby each 
state establishes a single point of contact (SPC) which is entrusted with the task of 
consolidating all information received from the United States Trade Representative (USTR) 
                                                            
71  G W Bowman ‘U.S. and Canadian Federalism: Implications for International Trade 
Regulation’ (2012) VA l. Rev.  1029. 
72  T Meyer and G Sitamaran, ‘Trade and the separation of Powers” (2018) Vanderbilt 
University Law School Legal Studies Research Paper no.18-19, 73-74 
73 Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. 103-465. 
74 19 U.S.C. § 3512(b)(2)(A). Also note that a similar limitation is typically included in US 
FTAs (see S Sheffler, ‘A Balancing ACT: State Participation in Free Trade Agreements with Sub-
Central Procurement Obligations, (2015) 44 Pub. Cont. L. J.733. 
75 T Meyer and G Sitamaran, supra footnote 72., 74. 
76 Ibid. 
77 S Sheffler, supra footnote 74, 740-743. 
78 See, for example, Appellate Body Report, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-
Border Supply of Gambling and betting Services WTO Doc. WT/DS285/AB/R. For a more detailed 
analysis of US liability for state-level violations of international trade law see T Meyer, ‘Local Liability 
in International Economic Law (2017) 95 N.C. L. Rev. 261. 
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and relaying any feedback from the states back to them 79 . It also established the 
Intergovernmental Policy Advisory Committee (IGPAC), a body composed of representatives 
of elected officials of both the federal and state governments, to “advise, consult with, make 
policy recommendations and provide information to the [USTR]”80.  
However, neither mechanism has proved effective in enhancing state influence on 
US trade policy. The SPC is barely used because of the sparsity of relevant information 
provided by the USTR. The IGPAC has also not fostered federal-state cooperation for a 
variety of reasons. Firstly, the operation of the IGPAC has been hampered by a lack of 
staffing and support at the federal level, as well as difficulties experienced by state officials in 
gaining security clearance to access confidential documents81. This has meant that few 
states have participated in the process82 which, in turn, has placed a significant burden on 
existing members to produce reports on a regular basis. Secondly, because there is no 
requirement to hold meetings on a regular basis (meetings can only be convened at the call 
of the USTR or at the call of two thirds of its members), the IGPAC meets only infrequently83.  
US international trade policy is thus characterised by strong tensions between the 
federal and state levels84. Because of the pre-eminence of the federal government in treaty-
making and the ineffectiveness of inter-governmental cooperative systems, states play but a 
marginal role in defining the country’s position in international trade negotiations. But the 
reluctance of Congress to pre-empt state measures inconsistent with international trade law 
obligations means that the federal government has often struggled to convince states to 
                                                            
79 C Freudlsperger, ‘More voice, less exit: sub-federal resistance to international procurement 
liberalization in the European Union, the United States and Canada’ (2018) 25(11 Journal of 
European Public Policy, 1694. 
80 Office of the United States Trade representative - Charter of the Intergovernmental Policy 
Advisory Committee on Trade.  
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81  C Kukucha, ‘Federalism matters: evaluating the impact of sub-federal governments in 
Canadian and American foreign trade policy’ (2015) 21(3) Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 230. 
82 On 17 November 2017, the IGPAC counted only 19 members. 
83 Supra footnote 81. 
84 Meyer and Sitamaran claim that the tensions between the federal and state governments 
with respect to trade agreements have caused U.S. trade federalism to be “at best in disarray and at 
worst at risk of collapsing into trade nationalism”. See T Meyer and G Sitamaran supra footnote 70, 
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implement trade liberalising commitments made in trade agreements. The resulting system 
is one where US struggles to negotiate commitments in areas that affect state competences 
and is increasingly the subject of claims challenging state measures85.   
(d) Germany 
Under the German Constitution (Grundgesetz), although foreign relations are a 
competence of the federation86, the sub-national entities (the “Länder”) must be consulted 
prior to the conclusion of any treaty which affects their special circumstances87. The Länder 
also have the power to conclude their own international treaties in areas where they have 
the power to legislate to the extent that they receive the consent of the federal government88. 
In addition, the Länder can also influence foreign affairs through the Bundesrat - that is, the 
upper house the German Parliament which is composed of members of the Land 
governments89. In accordance with 59 of the German Constitution, international treaties 
regulating the political relations of the Federation or relating to subjects of federal legislation 
require the consent of the Bundesrat. In short, the Länder can act in the field of international 
relations and the federal state cannot effectively, or constitutionally, conduct foreign affairs 
without their active involvement. 
Finally, with respect to the implementation of treaties, there is the question of 
whether international commitments negotiated by the federal state in areas of exclusive 
Länder competence can only be implemented by the latter. Although there is an argument 
that this should be the case as laws relating to exclusive Länder competence cannot be 
enacted at the federal level90, this is a question that has never been conclusively answered 
                                                            
85 T Meyer, supra footnote 78, 75.  
86 Article 32(1) German Constitution.  
87  Article 32(2)German Constitution. See C Panara, ‘In the Name of Cooperation: The 
External relations of the German  Länder and Their Participation in EU Decision –Making’ (2010) 6 
European Constitutional Law Review 64. 
88 Article 32(3) German Constitution. 
89  See M Niedobnitek, ‘The German Bundesrat and Executive Federalism’ (2018) 10(2) 
Perspectives on Federalism 201. 
90 B R Opeskin, ‘Constitutional Modelling: The Domestic Effect of International Law in Commonwealth 
Countries’ (2001) 27(2) Commonwealth Law Bulletin 1252 
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by German jurisprudence and also one where disagreement pervades in German 
constitutional scholarship 91 . However, in practice, potential for conflicts between the 
federation and Länder in areas where international treaties overlap with Länder 
competences, have been sidestepped by the development of formal system of cooperative 
federalism through which the Länder play an important role in the treaty-making process. 
This need for cooperation between the two levels of government has led to the 
development by the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) of the principle 
of loyalty/fidelity – that is, the reciprocal obligation between the federation and the Länder to 
pursue “affirmative cooperation and restraint whenever common interest so demands”92. It 
also led to the conclusion of the 1957 Lindau Accord between the federation and the Länder 
which details the mechanics of the cooperative relationship93. Firstly, Article 3 of the Accord 
provides that the consent of the  Länder is required where the where the federal state 
intends to conclude an agreement that falls exclusively within the competence of the Länder, 
and the former must be given an opportunity to participate in the negotiation of such 
agreements. Secondly, the Lindau Accord also provides that where it intends to negotiate an 
agreement that affects the interest of the Länder, the Federal state must give the Länder the 
opportunity to express their views and concerns at the earliest possible opportunity94.  
To put in practice such cooperation, the Lindau Accord also established a permanent 
body of high ranking Land representatives in charge of coordinating all interaction with the 
Federal Foreign Office95. Through the work of this body, the Länder have been able to 
secure information concerning international treaty negotiations and participate in the 
                                                            
91  Jurgen Brohmer, ‘The External Affairs Power in Australia and in Germany: Different 
Solutions, Similar Outcome’, 24 Giornale di Storia Costituzionale 49, 64 (2012), 58; R. Schutze, supra 
footnote 87189. 
92 D Halberstam ‘The Foreign Affairs of Federal Systems: A National perspective on the 
Benefits of State Participation’ (2001) 46(5) Villanova Law Review 36 
93  For an overview of the Lindau Accord see R Schutze, Foreign Affairs and the EU 
Constitution (CUP, 2014) 187-192 
94 R Hrbek, ‘The Federal Republic of Germany’ in Hans Michelmann (ed.) Foreign relations and 
Federalism (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009) 151. 
95 Ibid. 
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“preparatory phase of treaty making”96. These bodies are then complemented by multiple 
Federal-Länder committees that focus on specific issues that affect foreign policy97.  Finally, 
although as an EU Member State Germany does not have the power to conduct its own 
trade policy, under the German constitution, the Länder have been given specific rights with 
respect to decision making at EU level. Where the EU intends to act on an area that falls 
under supposedly “sensitive areas” of exclusive competence (education, culture or 
broadcasting), Germany will be represented within the Council of Ministers by a 
representative of the Länder appointed by the Bundesrat98. This representative takes a lead 
role on negotiations in the Council of Ministers and acts “with the participation and in 
coordination with” the federal government99. For all other matters falling within the Länder’s 
exclusive competences, the federal government has an obligation to involve and work in 
coordination with a Länder representative appointed by the Bundesrat in all negotiations and 
discussions held at EU level100.  
Germany’s approach of inter-governmental cooperation presents at least two 
features that render it more effective than the systems adopted in the United States. 
Whereas the consultation of US sub-national units is informal and depends on the goodwill 
of the federal government, in Germany the rights of the sub-national entities are guaranteed 
by constitutional law. The Länder have a right to be consulted in advance of treaty 
negotiations and to be involved in negotiations at EU level that pertain to exclusive areas of 
competence. And whereas the United States have created weak and under-funded 
institutional frameworks for inter-government cooperation, Germany has established a strong 
complex network of institutions that foster regular and constructive interaction between 
federal and sub-federal levels 
                                                            
96 Ibid. 
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 (d) Canada 
At the outset, Canadian federalism presented characteristics that were not too 
dissimilar to that of the US system of dual federalism101. Canada’s Constitution Act operates 
a clear distinction between the spheres of competence of the federal and sub-national 
(provincial) governments by identifying the competences assigned to federal and provincial 
levels as “exclusive” 102 . However, whilst the US federal system has evolved into a 
constitutional order where power is increasingly centralised, Canadian constitutional practice 
has safeguarded the autonomy of provinces by developing the principle of exclusivity of 
division of powers103. While there are limits to this principle104, Canadian federalism remains 
very much a system where each level of government remains “sovereign in its areas of 
jurisdiction, each adopting and implementing its own laws, programs and tax regimes”105. 
One of the consequences of the exclusive character of the distribution of powers in in 
Canada’s constitutional system is that provinces have a significant role to play in shaping 
foreign affairs.  Although the federal government has the exclusive competence to negotiate 
and commit Canada to international law obligations, Canada has a dualist system where the 
duty to implement international obligations falls on the entity with constitutional jurisdiction 
over the matter106. As a result, any obligation negotiated by the federal government which 
falls under the competence of a province may only be implemented under domestic law by 
the latter. Furthermore, only the federal government can be held legally responsible for non-
                                                            
101 See section 2(b). 
102 Section 92 Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11. 
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compliance with international obligations107. This means that in case of non-compliance by a 
province with international law, it is the federal government that will be held responsible and 
liable for the costs and damage incurred by Canada’s international interlocutors108.  
The absence of a direct legal obligation on provinces to comply with international law 
combined with the absence of a dispute settlement mechanism to compel provinces to 
comply, means that there is little incentive for provinces to comply with international rules 
negotiated by the federal government which are considered to go against their own 
interests109. Indeed, the inability of the federal government in Canada to guarantee provincial 
compliance with international obligations has, in the past, led to collapse of bilateral trade 
negotiations.110  
Consequently, in the context of the negotiation of international trade agreements, 
which touch on so many areas that fall within the competence of provinces, the particular 
constitutional make up of Canada raises concerns regarding its reliability as an international 
partner 111 . To address the unique role played by provinces in the implementation of 
international trade law obligations and to ensure that international commitments signed on to 
by the federal government are implemented, Canada has, over time, institutionalised 
cooperative mechanisms that allow for the consultation and sometimes even the 
involvement of provinces in trade negotiations.  
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Consultations occur in the framework of the Federal-Provincial Territorial Committee 
on Trade (C-Trade)112, a body composed of trade representatives from both the federal 
government and provincial executives. It meets on a quarterly basis to discuss a wide variety 
of trade policy issues from broad discussions on the general orientation of the Canadian 
international trade policy framework and Canada’s position in relation to the negotiation of 
bilateral or multilateral trade agreements 113 , to discussions on specific trade topics of 
relevance to the provinces114. In these meetings, the federal government representatives will 
outline the areas where trade agreements may harm defensive interests of provinces and 
balance them against those areas where provinces may have offensive interests to 
promote115. Beyond these meetings, the federal government also makes draft negotiating 
documents available to province representatives, who are invited to submit their 
observations and put forward their agendas. The C-Trade meetings therefore provide a 
platform for ongoing information exchange on the development of trade negotiations and a 
venue through which provinces can influence the negotiating positions of the federal 
government. In doing so, the discussions enhance the legitimacy of the negotiated 
agreements in the eyes of the provincial executives116.  
The C-Trade cooperation framework is also complemented by a number of 
consultative committees that focus on sector specific issues. For example, agriculture is not 
an issue that is typically addressed in the context of C-Trade but rather in a specifically 
designated federal-provincial committee 117 . Similarly, there are several ad hoc sectoral 
committees dealing with mutual recognition arrangements 118 . In addition to these 
consultative mechanisms, the provinces maintain regular dialogue with the federal 
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government on trade policy matters. Cooperation occurs through informal communication 
channels of communication between trade officials on both sides. However, informal 
cooperation remains limited to minor administrative and technical issues, rather than the 
more important policy issues119. This leads us to another key reason behind the success of 
Canadian provinces in influencing trade policy: the provinces have invested significant 
resources in building capacity and expertise across the board on trade policy matters, to the 
extent that in some areas their expertise is considered to be superior to, and their input is 
actively sought out by, the federal government120.   
Finally, it should be noted that there are recent examples of occasions where the role 
of provinces in trade negotiations was elevated to that of an active participant in trade 
negotiations. During the negotiations of the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic Trade 
Agreement, the EU, which was hoping to gain access to the provincial procurement markets 
in Canada, requested that provinces be involved in the negotiation process. Throughout the 
negotiations, the provinces’ role included the “co-determination of negotiating positions, as 
well as the direct participation as members of the Canadian delegation”121 in the areas of 
services, technical barriers to trade, labour, sustainable development investment, 
procurement and competition. Provincial representatives were also able to engage directly 
with EU trade officials on a bilateral basis to discuss particularly sensitive issues. Another 
recent example can be found in the context of the negotiation on the Comprehensive and 
Progressive TransPacific Partnership (CPTPP)122 where, at the request of the United States, 
provinces were not allowed to present sit at the negotiating table but were briefed after all 
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negotiating meetings and given the opportunity to voice their concerns and advise on 
matters that fell within their competence123. 
The Canadian model of inter-governmental cooperation presents a number of 
features that explain its success relative to other federal systems that have experimented 
with executive federalism in the area of trade policy. The first distinctive feature relates to the 
constitutional limitations imposed on the central government regarding the implementation of 
treaties, which have meant that Canada was strongly incentivised to develop mechanisms 
that have integrated provinces and amplified their voice in trade policy making. Secondly, 
although C-Trade effectively remains a political body that is not protected by statute, it 
operates under a formal structure and under strict rules. Unlike committees such as the 
IGPAC, that can only meet at the request of governments, the C-Trade meets on a quarterly 
basis.  Further, as C-Trade is composed of high-level trade representatives from provincial 
and federal level, it combines both political heft and expertise. The committee has, as a 
result, been used as a forum where important trade issues can be discussed constructively, 
rather than simply being viewed as a forum where provinces can be merely be debriefed on 
the latest developments. The fact that the work of C-Trade is complemented by various 
working committees that focus on more specific technical issues also has two important 
consequences. It means that central government and the provinces are better prepared to 
articulate positions in advance of meetings and that minor issues can be addressed an 
appropriate level, which then allows C-Trade meetings to address more important and 
sensitive policy issues. Thirdly, the role of provinces in Canada’s trade agreements has not 
been limited exclusively to consultations. Where needed and possible, provinces have also 
been involved in the negotiation process and have played a key role in in advancing trade 
negotiations. The close involvement of provinces in the CETA negotiations is said to have 
“improved communication, transparency and cooperation which have reduced the incentive 
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for provincial and territorial governments to push for a greater role”124. Together these 
features of the Canadian inter-governmental cooperation have led to the increased impact of 
provinces in the outcome of trade negotiations which, in turn, has led to a decrease in 
provincial resistance to trade agreements and a reduction in the use of threats of non-
implementation of trade obligations by the provinces125. 
(e) Accounting for differing of approaches to trade federalism 
The preceding discussion has shown how the nature and level of interaction between 
federal levels and subnational levels of government can vary significantly from one federal 
system to another.  
Both the German and the Canadian brands of federalism have led to the 
development of effective intergovernmental cooperation in the field of international relations 
between federal and sub-national governments. In both cases, such cooperation is 
underpinned by the existence of strong constitutional powers that have, either directly or 
indirectly, allowed sub-national entities to wield influence in foreign/trade policy.  
In Germany, the power of the Länder to affect international relations is directly 
recognized and protected under the German Constitution which enshrines the right of the  
Länder to be consulted in the event where the federal government intends to conclude a 
treaty that affects  Länder competences. The right to be consulted is then complemented by 
the constitutional principle federal comity or loyalty and reinforced by the Lindau Agreement 
which requires the prior consent of the Länder when the federal government concludes a 
treaty that falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the former.  
Besides, even in the absence of such guarantees, it would have been very difficult for 
the German federal government to ignore the Länder in the conduct of foreign affairs as the 
Länder have the power to implement international obligations in their fields of competence. 
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Indeed, in the case of Canada, provinces do not have de jure treaty-making powers. There is 
no constitutionally protected right to consult provinces or to seek their consent on matters 
that would affect provincial competences. But the mere fact that provinces have the 
exclusive competence to implement international obligations in their fields of competence 
gives them considerable leverage in international trade negotiations.   
In both the German and Canadian cases then, there were good reasons to develop 
formal institutional structures through which both levels of governments can cooperate on 
foreign affairs matters that overlap with sub-national competence. In the specific case of 
Canada, it has led to the development of dedicated formal structures of cooperation in the 
area of international trade which allow provinces to not only be consulted on the progress of 
trade negotiations but also, in some cases, to actively participate in these trade negotiations 
At first sight, US federalism should have led to the development of a similar system to 
that of Canada. The US federal government has the sole competence to conduct 
negotiations and conclude trade agreements but only has limited powers to compel states to 
comply with international trade obligations. However, whilst these circumstances led to the 
development of a strong system of inter-governmental cooperation in Canada, in the U.S., 
states have largely been left out of the loop when it comes to trade negotiations. One 
explanation for this, provided by Christopher Kukutcha, relates to the distinction between the 
concepts of intra-federalism and inter-state federalism. In intrastate federal systems, sub-
national interests are represented at the federal level through state parliamentary 
representatives126. The U.S. provides a classic example of such intrastate federalism. It has 
a bicameral system where legislators are subdivided into two powerful parliamentary 
assemblies, one of which – the U.S. Senate - is composed of members who are entrusted 
with the task of representing sub-federal entities. In such systems, the federal executive 
places far more emphasis on addressing state interests voiced within the national 
parliamentary systems than on managing relationships with the executives of sub-federal 
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entities127. By contrast, in federal interstate systems such as Canada, sub-federal executives 
tend to be far more powerful. Whilst Canada also has a bicameral system of representation, 
its second chamber is comparatively weak compared to that of the United States because it 
is composed of senators who are only loosely connected with the provinces and who are 
appointed by political parties rather than being directly elected128. The upshot is that the 
federal executive has, historically, been far more engaged with the provincial executives 
when dealing with matters that affect the latter129. 
 
4. UK DEVOLUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
(a) Pre-eminence of national executive in foreign affairs UK Foreign affairs  
The UK is not a federal system but rather a territorially devolved constitutional 
system130. By comparison with federal systems, the UK remains a highly centralised state, 
where devolved territories enjoy far less autonomy and fewer constitutional guarantees than 
sub-national federal entities131. This can be seen in the very limited role played by devolved 
administrations in foreign policy. Foreign affairs are a reserved132 (or ‘excepted’133) matter, 
meaning that the negotiation and conclusion of international treaties fall under the exclusive 
competence of the Crown. Indeed, the broad powers of the executive in the field of foreign 
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affairs was recently confirmed in Miller134, where the UK Supreme Court confirmed that the 
power to make treaties fell under the scope of the Royal prerogative135. 
Furthermore, the UK adopts a strong dualist approach, whereby international treaties 
must be incorporated into domestic law in order to be given effect136. This is achieved 
through an Act of Parliament – whether an act specifically implementing the treaty or one 
delegating or providing a framework for future implementation137. In accordance with the 
Sewel Convention138, whilst the UK Parliament retains the authority to legislate on any issue, 
the government must proceed with the understanding that, barring the consent of devolved 
legislature, the UK Parliament must not legislate on devolved matters139. In theory, the Sewel 
Convention could be triggered where an Act of Parliament is required to domesticate an 
international treaty which touches on devolved matters. However, in Miller 140 , the UK 
Supreme Court dismissed the idea of the Sewel Convention as a “legal rule justiciable by the 
courts” 141 , viewing it instead as a political convention aimed merely at “facilitating the 
harmonious relationships between the UK Parliament and the devolved legislatures”142. In 
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doing so, Miller confirmed the notion that compared to federal systems, in the UK’s system 
of devolution, sovereignty remains very much centralised.  
Devolved administrations are not completely excluded from UK foreign affairs. They 
do have a responsibility to enact implementing legislation, where an international obligation 
falls wholly within a devolved matter143. However, even here, central government has the 
power to order devolved administrations not to adopt a measure or to revoke a measure 
which it considers to be incompatible with international obligations144.There is, therefore, 
only a very limited role for devolved administrations in the shaping and implementation of UK 
foreign policy.  
 
(b) Inter-governmental relations in foreign affairs 
Despite this reduced role for devolved administrations, to the extent that the foreign 
policy conducted by the UK government can impact on devolved matters, the UK has 
developed a series of agreements which provide guidelines and mechanisms to ensure 
cooperation in policy making in matters that fall within the sphere of competence of the 
devolved administrations 145 . The main agreement is embodied in the Memorandum of 
Understanding on Devolution which provides the various principles underpinning inter-
governmental relations, such as the principles of communication and consultation, the duty 
to cooperate and the principle of confidentiality. This memorandum is then complemented by 
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five supplementary agreements (‘concordats’) which address specific aspects of the 
relationship between the various administrations146.  
The first concordat establishes a Joint Ministerial Committee (JMC), the main 
institutional body through which cooperation occurs, as well as concordats dealing with 
matters such as EU affairs, international relations, statistics and financial assistance to 
industry147. The JMC meetings can take two forms: (i) a plenary JMC meeting, which is held 
on an annual basis and comprises the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister, as well as 
the First Ministers and Deputies and the Secretary of State of each devolved administration; 
and (ii) functional JMC meetings comprising departmental ministries of the UK and devolved 
administrations, which are held upon request of the relevant administrations148.  
The concordat on international relations sets out a number of guidelines for 
cooperation between the UK government and devolved administrations in international 
relations. Firstly, there are requirements relating to information exchanges 149 . The UK 
government is required to make devolved administrations aware of international 
developments that touch on devolved matters, and devolved administrations must also 
inform the government of developments in devolved administrations that may affect 
international relations. Secondly, with respect to the shaping and development of foreign 
policy, the UK government must consult devolved administrations on matters of foreign 
policy that will affect devolved matters. Devolved administrations may also “hold working 
level discussions” 150  with countries or within international organisations on matters that 
pertain to devolved matters, and may form part of UK negotiating teams on negotiations that 
“bear directly on devolved matters”151. Thirdly, with respect to implementation, the concordat 
recalls that devolved administrations are legally bound to implement all international 
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obligations undertaken by the UK, even in areas that pertain to devolved matters152. The UK 
government must notify any new international obligations to devolved administrations whose 
implementation falls within their remit 153 . Although devolved administrations are free to 
decide how to implement these obligations, they must consult with relevant UK departments 
to ensure the consistent and compatible implementation of these obligations throughout the 
territory of the UK154.  In the event of legal proceedings being brought against the UK before 
international courts or arbitration panels, the UK will act as the sole representative155 . 
Devolved administrations can, if the cases relate to the implementation of devolved matters, 
contribute to such proceedings by issuing instructions to council and participating in 
hearings156. In relation to the issue of liability, the devolved administrations are responsible 
for the payment or any compensation and costs awarded against the UK for their failure to 
implement or enforce an international obligation157. 
(c) The limited effectiveness of the UK system of inter-governmental relations 
In theory, the concordats should provide a framework for inter-governmental 
cooperation in areas of foreign policy that overlap with devolved matters. In practice, 
however, the concordats have not worked particularly well.  In 2015, the House of Lords 
Select Committee on the Constitution issued a report on inter-governmental relations which 
found that, with the exception of the European Affairs sub-committee, the JMC had proved 
highly ineffective in fostering cooperation between the UK government and devolved 
administrations. Representatives of devolved administrations viewed the JMC as a forum 
that is used to air broad political grievances rather than discuss practical issues in a 
constructive manner158. The approach of the UK government to JMC was also criticised as a 
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box-ticking exercise, and because the meetings were rarely used to discuss any issues of 
substance159. The modest success of the EU Affairs sub-committee was attributed to the fact 
that the meetings were organised by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, a body used to 
negotiating with people holding different positions, and the fact that the need to settle a 
common position in advance of meetings at EU level meant that the work of this sub-
committee was more focused compared to the others160. Even here, however, it was noted 
that the views of ministers of devolved administrations were heard but routinely ignored161. 
Clearly then, the UK’s system of inter-governmental cooperation, as it currently 
stands, would not provide devolved administrations the type of influence on trade policy that 
is bestowed on Canadian provinces. This should come as no surprise as, firstly, the UK 
devolved administrations do not have a right to be consulted and lack the leverage available 
to Canadian provinces and German and Länder which results from their competence to 
implement international obligations that fall within their competences. Because the 
concordats are not legally binding, and therefore create no obligation to cooperate,  the UK 
devolved administrations are left mostly reliant on the goodwill of the central government to 
adopt an inclusive and cooperative approach to engage with devolved administrations and 
reflect their viewpoints in national policy. This is aptly illustrated by the fact that no JMCs 
were held from 2002 to 2008162. There are also numerous of examples where the UK has 
simply decided against involving devolved administrations in any type of consultative 
process, even in devolved matters, in order to avoid having to accommodate their views163.  
Secondly, the concordats only establish very loose forms of cooperation. The plenary 
JMC meeting is held on an annual basis and is consequently viewed mostly as a formality 
and, at best, an opportunity to present and discuss broad policy agendas. And whilst the 
functional JMC and working level groups should in principle allow for more detailed technical 
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discussion, these are only held on ad hoc basis, meaning that they do not provide the sort of 
continuity that is required in order to foster mutual trust. In practice, most cooperation 
between the UK national and devolved administrations has occurred through informal 
channels and the development of personal relationships between administrations164. This 
creates the possibility that the level of cooperation will vary from one devolved administration 
to another or even within one administration, depending on the ability of individuals to 
engage with each other 165 . There are also problems associated with the lack of 
accountability in informal cooperation, as it is more difficult to assess the nature and impact 
of discussions that are based on bilateral relationships166.   
 
5. DEVOLUTION AND POST-BREXIT TRADE AGREEMENTS 
(a) A new framework for inter-governmental cooperation in trade? 
 
The deficiencies associated with the UK’s system of inter-governmental relations 
may prove problematic in the context of the UK’s post-Brexit trade policy, as EU trade 
powers are repatriated and subject to increased domestic public scrutiny.  A good example 
can already be seen with respect to the growing debate surrounding the possibility of a 
future UK-US FTA and, in particular, the potential impact on areas of sensitivity for devolved 
administrations, such as food standards (a devolved matter) and geographical indications 
such as Scotch Whiskey167. Under the current system, it would be perfectly possible for the 
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UK government to negotiate a trade agreement that would affect these maters without 
consulting or involving devolved administrations in any meaningful way. 
To address these deficiencies, the UK should consider the establishment of a formal 
and institutionalised system of cooperation based on regular consultations. The formal 
cooperation mechanism can adapt the template set by Canadian inter-governmentalism and 
create a Joint Committee on Trade (JCT) focused exclusively on trade. The JCT would be 
composed of relevant ministerial representatives of the central government and devolved 
administrations and meet four times per year to discuss major issues relating to trade 
agreements, such as the setting of negotiation objectives and common positions, the 
identification of areas where trade agreements should reflect the specific circumstances of 
devolved territories and even the potential disputes that may arise in connection with this 
agreements.  
However, simply transposing the Canadian system of inter-governmentalism into the 
UK would not be a magic bullet given the sui generis characteristics of UK devolution. The 
constitutional restrictions on the powers of devolved administrations mean that the leverage 
available to devolved administrations to force the central government to take their interests 
and views into account when negotiating trade agreements will be limited. Without a 
constitutional right to be consulted and the threat of non-implementation, the power relations 
between central government and devolved administrations are strongly skewed in favour of 
the former. And as the experience of inter-governmental relations in the UK show, there will 
be an incentive for central government to simply ignore the devolved administrations where it 
considers that they will create obstacles to the achievement of their foreign policy goals168. 
For this reason, it is argued that that the UK should go further than the Canadian model 
by enshrining in statute the right of devolved administrations to be consulted in connection 
with future UK trade agreements as well as the institutional and procedural frameworks 
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through which such consultation can occur. Inter-governmental cooperation in this area 
would be made legally binding to ensure that cooperation occurs on a quarterly basis rather 
than on an ad hoc basis. It is further proposed that the right of devolved authorities to be 
consulted would cover all aspects of trade agreements – that is, the right of devolved 
authorities would not be limited to the components of trade agreements that touch on 
devolved matters. This is because, as discussed169, irrespective of the scope of devolved 
matters, trade agreements stand to have significant economic impact devolved regions.  
 The additional security resulting from the requirement to hold regular meetings would 
encourage the devolved administrations to assume responsibility in trade matters, and to 
make the necessary investment to develop capacity and expertise in trade matters170. As the 
Canadian model shows, the regular dialogue would also build trust between the parties 
which is more likely to lead to constructive cooperation171. 
The formal institutionalised mechanisms of cooperation should also reflect the complex 
nature of contemporary trade agreements. As discussed172, the complexity relates to the 
variety of subject matters regulated in trade agreements as well as the processes involved in 
negotiating, concluding and implementing them. Firstly, the UK’s new institutional framework 
for inter-governmental relation in trade should reflect the fact that there a number of areas 
covered in trade negotiations that overlap with devolved matters. Here again, the UK could 
take inspiration from the Canadian model and grant the JCT the power to establish working 
committees focused on key areas of strategic interests for devolved administrations. These 
sub-committees would be composed of civil service staff with expertise on specific trade 
issues from both central government and devolved administrations, and would be used to 
carry out more technical discussions. Secondly, the UK should consider going beyond the 
Canadian model by ensuring that cooperation takes into account the dynamic nature of trade 
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agreements. Cooperation should not be limited to initial consultations but encompass the 
entire lifespan of trade agreements from the decision to launch negotiations to the 
conclusion of the agreement and even beyond. Indeed, in the Canadian model, 
consultations have so far been limited to the negotiation phase of trade agreements173. Once 
concluded, the role of the provinces is typically limited to that of implementing the trade 
agreement. Yet, there has been a recent trend in trade agreements between large 
developed economies to incorporate regulatory cooperation mechanisms that are intended 
to provide a forum where regulatory divergences can be identified and ironed out 
progressively174. This is the case of the EU-Canada CETA, which establishes a Regulatory 
Cooperation Forum to explore and discuss policy issues and initiatives that may affect 
trade175. A similar mechanism was also considered in the context of the negotiations for the 
EU-US TTIP176, leading some to refer to the agreement as a “living agreement” where 
regulatory approximation can be discussed and new norms developed 177 . Finally, the 
CPTPP178 – an agreement the UK has recently signalled its intent to accede to post Brexit – 
also contains a “Regulatory Coherence” chapter which creates an institutional framework 
with the aim of, inter alia, assessing the possibility of eliminating regulatory barriers on an 
ongoing basis179.  In other words, cotemporary trade agreements are increasingly looking to 
create institutional frameworks that allow the parties to negotiate regulatory issues post-
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ratification. And if devolved authorities are to be granted the right to be consulted in the 
context of trade negotiations, there is no reason why this right should not also be extended 
to negotiations that are being held post-ratification, especially if such negotiations pertain to 
regulatory areas that overlap with devolved matters 
Finally, consideration must also be given to the right of devolved administrations to 
participate in trade negotiations. Again, the UK model could go further than Canada by 
providing a legally binding obligation to include representatives from devolved regions in 
negotiations where such negotiations relate specifically to devolved matters. Both the 
Canadian and German experiences show that the inclusion of sub-national representations 
in international negotiations need not undermine the cohesion of a country’s negotiating 
position. On the contrary, in both cases, the evidence suggests that the involvement of 
representatives of devolved administrations would add a layer of legitimacy to the 
negotiation process and improve the chances of successful outcome. In other words, 
allowing for such representation would not only reflect the fact that devolved a territories are 
also responsible for matters addressed in trade agreements, but also further reinforce buy-in 
for such agreements at devolved levels. Further, the participation of devolved 
administrations could also facilitate trade negotiations. Since they are more experienced and 
attuned to the complexities of matters that fall wholly within devolved competence, they may 
also be better placed to put forward solutions and break deadlocks that may arise in relation 
to such matters.  
(b) Potential limitations of proposal 
A system along such lines would not be a panacea. Firstly, there is a lot more that 
devolved administrations can do to enhance their influence. A significant investment will 
have to be made by devolved administrations to improve their capacity in dealing with trade 
policy issues. There is very little point in giving devolved administrations a platform to 
influence decision making at Whitehall if they are not able to formulate coherent positions on 
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the wide array of complex issues that are covered in trade agreements. This will require, for 
example, the allocation of resources to recruit and build expertise in the field and the 
implementation of mechanisms that allow for coordination of expertise of policies across 
internal departments and the further development of para-diplomatic activities180.  
Secondly, there are limits to what can be achieved through cooperative frameworks. 
There is no guarantee, nor should there be one, that devolved territories will secure all of 
their respective objectives in future trade agreements. As it negotiates trade agreements, the 
UK will inevitably face difficult choices and be forced to make trade-offs between its 
sometimes conflicting economic interests. The price for opening up a lucrative foreign 
market in a sector where the UK has a clear offensive interest may be to open its own 
market to foreign competition in sectors where it is at a comparative disadvantage. In such 
cases, however, the value of a formalised system of inter-governmental cooperation is that 
these difficult choices can be openly debated prior to and during the negotiation processes, 
whilst also giving governments time to explore domestic adjustment measures that can be 
put in place to compensate workers and sectors that will lose out from trade liberalisation.  
Finally, it must be noted that formal cooperation also presents certain drawbacks. 
One obvious counter-argument to the above proposals is that it creates overly burdensome 
barriers to the negotiation of trade agreements. This concern is further enhanced by the fact 
that the UK currently finds itself in a race against time to sign as many trade agreements as 
possible to compensate for the inevitable loss of market access that will result from leaving 
the EU – both in terms of access to the EU internal market and third countries with whom the 
EU has preferential trade arrangements in place. But this argument is not particularly 
persuasive. The experience of trade federalism suggests there, even in countries where 
subnational entities have a significant influence on international trade policy matters, federal 
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governments tend to retain the final say in the determination of trade policy with the role of 
sub-national entities being limited to that of consultation. As Farfard and Leblond point out, 
“in the final analysis, the role of subnational government remains advisory and the federal 
government can, and routinely does, ignore the concerns of one or more subnational 
governments” 181  . One might add to this that, any attempt to exclude devolved 
administrations from the realm of international trade politics, whilst perhaps tempting in the 
short term, will prove ineffective and even counter-productive in the long-term. It is a far 
better approach to develop mechanisms that empower devolved administrations and 
acknowledge their interests in trade policy, whilst at the same time carefully delineating the 
limits of their involvement in the process of the negotiation and conclusion of trade 
agreements. Such an inclusive approach where trade policy is shaped by a broad-based 
debate would also send a far more positive signal in terms of the type of country that the UK 
wishes to be in a post-Brexit world. 
6. CONCLUSION 
There is a strong argument that, post-Brexit, the UK should be able to speak with one 
voice in most matters that pertain to external trade policy. To do otherwise would diminish 
the country’s leverage in trade negotiations and, ultimately, undermine the integrity of its 
single market. But trade policy must also be constructed in a manner that reflects the 
political and constitutional specificities of devolution. Devolved administrations have an ever-
expanding list of competences which overlap with many issues regulated under 
contemporary trade agreements. The economic profiles, the defensive and offensive 
economic interests and the political agendas of devolved territories vary significantly from 
one region to the next. Indeed, one of the many lessons to be drawn from the results of the 
British referendum on the UK’s membership of the EU is that it is a heterogeneous country 
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composed of nations with sometimes starkly different interests, politics and values182. In light 
of the increasingly politicised and controversial nature of international trade politics, to carry 
out a trade policy that would ride roughshod over the desires of devolved administrations 
would be a recipe for further division and fragmentation.  
The question thus raised is how to develop internal mechanisms that give devolved 
administrations a real voice and influence in shaping the UK’s future trade agreements 
without inhibiting the UK’s ability to pursue a coherent trade policy. Various models of inter-
governmental cooperation have been developed in federal systems, with variable degrees of 
success. There is, however, no ready-made model that could seamlessly be transposed in 
the UK. Each cooperative framework is the result of the particular specificities of the 
constitutional and political system of the country. As discussed, the Canadian model, would 
not necessarily yield the same results if emulated in the UK, for the simple reason that the 
power and leverage of devolved administrations is considerably smaller than that of 
subnational entities in decentralised federations such as Canada.  
This paper argues that the highly centralised nature of legal sovereignty in the UK 
and the resulting lack of leverage available to UK devolved administrations in the exercise of 
foreign affairs is precisely the reason why the UK must go further than the Canadian model 
to ensure a meaningful role for devolved administrations in the shaping of future trade 
agreements. In order to achieve this, the UK should move away from its loose brand of inter-
governmental cooperation based on ad hoc meetings and informal relations, and replace it 
with a legally-binding institutionalised mechanism of vertical cooperation. Such a mechanism 
would include the establishment of a Joint Committee on Trade between ministerial 
representatives of the Department for International Trade and devolved administrations, 
which would be required to hold regular meetings and which would be further complemented 
by specialised working committees focused on more technical issues of trade that overlap 
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with devolved matters. In addition, it is proposed that devolved administrations’ rights should 
not be limited to simply being consulted, but should include active engagement all in stages 
of negotiation and implementation of a trade agreement. 
 There is, of course, a broader context within which the seemingly mundane question 
about the role to be played by devolved administrations in future trade agreements is being 
played out. This discussion feeds into a broader debate concerning the role and 
constitutional and political status of devolved territories in the UK post-Brexit. The idea that 
the UK’s ineffective inter-governmental relations mechanisms should be overhauled is not 
new. A reform is long overdue. But the case for reform has been reinforced by Brexit, the 
repatriation of powers and the inevitable tensions that result from conflicting views between 
devolved administrations and Whitehall with respect to the allocation and exercise of such 
powers. Calls for greater devolved powers and differentiation183 run against an instinctive 
inclination from Whitehall towards the centralisation of powers to protect the integrity of the 
UK’s internal market.184 Finding the correct balance between these two conflicting agendas 
will be one of the main constitutional challenges faced by the UK in the coming years. So far, 
based on the Trade Bill and the poorly-executed attempts to involve devolved 
administrations in the Brexit negotiations, the general direction of travel suggests that the 
balance may be skewed towards centralisation. The upshot, if this approach is followed with 
respect to trade policy, would be the conclusion of trade agreements that are entirely 
unmoored from the politics, interests and preferences of devolved territories.   
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